University of North Dakota

UND Scholarly Commons
Theses and Dissertations

Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects

January 2021

The Impact Of Social Anxiety On Co-Witness Suggestibility
Susan Schober

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses

Recommended Citation
Schober, Susan, "The Impact Of Social Anxiety On Co-Witness Suggestibility" (2021). Theses and
Dissertations. 3941.
https://commons.und.edu/theses/3941

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at UND
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator
of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

SOCIAL ANXIETY AND CO-WITNESS SUGGESTIBILITY

THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL ANXIETY ON CO-WITNESS SUGGESTIBILITY
by
Susan Elise Schober
Bachelor of Science, University of Wisconsin-Green Bay, 2019
A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of the
University of North Dakota
in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of
Master of Science

Grand Forks, North Dakota
May
2021

i

SOCIAL ANXIETY AND CO-WITNESS SUGGESTIBILITY

This thesis, submitted by Susan Schober in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science from the University of North Dakota, has been read by the Faculty
Advisory Committee under whom the work has been done and is hereby approved.

_______________________________________
Alison Kelly
_______________________________________
Andre Kehn
_______________________________________
Joseph Miller

This thesis is being submitted by the appointed advisory committee as having met all of
the requirements of the School of Graduate Studies at the University of North Dakota and is
hereby approved.
____________________________________
Chris Nelson
Dean of the School of Graduate Studies
_____________________________________
Date

ii

SOCIAL ANXIETY AND CO-WITNESS SUGGESTIBILITY

PERMISSION
Title

The Impact of Social Anxiety on Co-Witness Suggestibility

Department

Psychology

Degree

Master of Science

In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a graduate degree
from the University of North Dakota, I agree that the library of this University shall make it
freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for extensive copying for scholarly
purposes may be granted by the professor who supervised my thesis work or, in her absence, by
the Chairperson of the department or the dean of the School of Graduate Studies. It is understood
that any copying or publication or other use of this thesis or part thereof for financial gain shall
not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be
given to me and to the University of North Dakota in any scholarly use which may be made of
any material in my thesis.

Susan Schober
April 16, 2021

iii

SOCIAL ANXIETY AND CO-WITNESS SUGGESTIBILITY

TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Tables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii
Abstract. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .viii
Eyewitness Memory and the Misinformation Effect. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
The Impact of Co-Witness Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
Memory Conformity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Individual Differences in Co-Witness Suggestibility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Social Anxiety and Misinformation Susceptbility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
The Present Study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Method. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Participants and Confederates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Materials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Eyewitness Stimulus Film. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Confederate Scripts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Filler Tasks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
Social Anxiety Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
Individual Cued-Recall Test. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Demographic Questionnaire and Post-Experiment Survey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
Procedure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

iv

SOCIAL ANXIETY AND CO-WITNESS SUGGESTIBILITY

Social Anxiety and PEI Condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
Memory Report Analysis (Collaborative Recall). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Cued-Recall Test Analysis (Individual Recall). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
Social Anxiety and Co-Witness Influence (Collaborative Recall). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Social Anxiety and Individual Recall Differences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
Memory Confidence and Type of Post-Event Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
Social Anxiety and Memory Confidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
Post-Experiment Survey Differences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
Discussion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Appendix A: Confederate Script. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Appendix B: Cued-Recall Test. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Appendix C: Post-Experiment Survey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

v

SOCIAL ANXIETY AND CO-WITNESS SUGGESTIBILITY

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Critical itmes in cued-recall test with information provided during CW discussion. . . 14
Table 2: Means and standard deviations of main effects for individual cued recall by post-event
information (PEI Type). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

vi

SOCIAL ANXIETY AND CO-WITNESS SUGGESTIBILITY

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to express my sincere appreciation to the members of my advisory committee for their
guidance and support during my time in the master’s program at the University of North Dakota.

vii

SOCIAL ANXIETY AND CO-WITNESS SUGGESTIBILITY

Abstract
Misleading post-event information, especially presented through co-witness discussion, has
consistently shown to be a powerful way to alter a witness’s memory for an event. Less is known
about how misleading co-witness information affects those with specific individual difference
traits, however. The current study analyzed the impact of social anxiety on susceptibility to cowitness misinformation and memory conformity (i.e., co-witness suggestibility). Participants
viewed a short film of a simulated home robbery and some discussed the film with a confederate
posing as a co-witness. During the discussion, the confederate introduced either accurate or
misleading information about events in the film. After the discussion, the participant-confederate
pairs wrote a collaborative police report, and an individual recall test followed. Participants
receiving accurate PEI had higher correct recall both collaboratively and individually, while
participants receiving misleading PEI had higher misleading item recall both collaboratively and
individually. In this preliminary sample, social anxiety did not predict differences in correct or
misleading item recall (both collaboratively and individually), suggesting that social anxiety may
not increase a person’s vulnerability to co-witness suggestibility.
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The Impact of Social Anxiety on Co-Witness Suggestibility
Eyewitness Memory and the Misinformation Effect
Eyewitness memory can be subject to contamination in a variety of ways because human
memory is so malleable. When individuals attempt to recall specific details of an event,
contamination can create a memory for the event that is misleading or incorrect. Exposure to
post-event information is one of the more widely studied ways in which memory contamination
can occur. The effects of post-event information become even more damaging when the
information encountered is incorrect (i.e., misinformation). According to Loftus (2005), the
misinformation effect is defined as an impairment in memory that arises after there is exposure
to misleading post-event information.
The misinformation effect has been included in a considerable amount of eyewitness
memory research. Many of the studies that have analyzed the misinformation effect have used a
standard three-stage procedure where participants experience a complex event, receive additional
information (true or false) about that event, and are then prompted to recall information during a
memory test for the event. There is consistency in the research findings that misinformation
often ends up being incorporated into the witness’ memory of the event. This misinformation can
lead individuals to believe that they saw things even if they were never there. Or believe they
saw things differently from the way they really were (Loftus, 1992). For example, one of the
classic demonstrations of the misinformation effect involves participants viewing a simulated car
accident that includes a stop sign. After being given misinformation about a yield sign,
individuals often reported seeing a yield sign instead of the stop sign that was present in the
simulation (Loftus, 2005).
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Researchers have also studied how misinformation potentially impacts eyewitness
memory for simulated crimes. For example, after watching a simulation where a victim clearly
becomes injured on a specific part of their body (i.e., on their arm), misinformation typically
influences participants to recall the injury as being somewhere else on the body (i.e., on a leg)
(Loftus, 2005). Additionally, Takarangi et al. (2006) showed participants a short movie about a
tradesman snooping around an unoccupied home. The tradesman dug through personal items in
the home, ate food, and stole various items. Participants also read a narrative about the film that
included misinformation about critical items. Participants were then given a recognition test
where they had to answer statements about items or events from the movie. Results indicated that
participants were more accurate about the control items than the misled items and were also
more confident about the accuracy of misled items. Overall, this suggests observing an event and
being exposed to misinformation can distort a witness’ memory. These findings hold important
implications for the criminal justice system because eyewitnesses are quite regularly exposed to
post-event information and their memories for events are malleable.
The Impact of Co-Witness Information
There are different ways individuals can be exposed to misleading post-event
information, including through leading questions or suggestive techniques used by interrogators
in the criminal justice system (Loftus, 2005) or through media coverage of an event. Even more
common is the transfer of misinformation through a co-witness. This can take place when
individuals discuss the events of a crime they have witnessed together. One might also overhear
another witness share their memory of an event. Or this can occur through a third party, such as a
police officer, disclosing information or sharing statements from another co-witness. While this
discussion between witnesses of a crime can sometimes have a positive impact, it is more likely
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that it could lead to the transfer of misinformation (Paterson et al., 2009). Thus, legal procedures
have been constructed based on the fact that dangers can arise when witnesses discuss the event
with one another (Paterson & Kemp, 2005).
Research has also compared how various sources of co-witness information differently
impact a witness’ memory for an event. For instance, Shaw et al. (1997) focused on the effects of
co-witness information and suggestive questioning on the accuracy of eyewitness memory
reports. One experiment illustrated the experience of a witness receiving information about the
event from an interviewer or documentation of what other witnesses have already declared. Two
additional experiments simulated a situation where a witness received information directly from
a co-witness. Across all three experiments, participants were significantly more likely to give
incorrect responses when they were given incorrect information about a co-witness’ response.
Thus, the effects of co-witness misinformation were much larger than those of suggestive
questioning.
Further, Gabbert et al. (2004) had both young (17-33) and old (58-80) participants view a
simulated crime and then exposed them to misinformation in one of two ways: during a
discussion about the event with a confederate or embedded within a written narrative about the
event that the participants were asked to read. After encountering misinformation, the
participants were less accurate than the controls who had not been introduced to misinformation.
An important finding for both the young and older adult groups was that misinformation
encountered socially (via a confederate) led to more errors than the information from a nonsocial source (the written narrative).
Similarly, Paterson and Kemp (2006) compared how the different means of encountering
post-event information impacted memory for a witnessed event. After watching a simulated
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robbery, participants were exposed to both correct and incorrect post-event information. The
misinformation was introduced to the participants through either leading questions, a media
report, indirect co-witness information (a narrative summary given by a hypothetical co-witness),
or co-witness discussion using a confederate. One week later, the individuals were tested on their
memory of the video. The results clearly showed that co-witness information had the largest
influence on eyewitness memory, as the participants were much more likely to recall the
misleading post-event information that came from both the co-witness narrative and the cowitness discussion.
Misleading post-event information that comes from a co-witness can also inflate
participants’ confidence in their memory accuracy. For example, participants in co-witness
information conditions reported higher levels of confidence in incorrect responses that were
based on misleading post-event information (Paterson & Kemp, 2006). Similarly, Goodwin et al.
(2017) found that participants exhibited what is referred to as a “confidence conformity effect.”
This means that participants’ confidence in their own memories mimicked the confidence of
their co-witnesses. For example, when a misleading co-witness was highly confident,
participants reported having higher levels of confidence in their recall of misleading information.
Taken together, these increased confidence levels suggest participants may be more likely to
endorse and believe misleading post-event information to be true.
Preventing discussion between witnesses is extremely difficult and at the same time
extremely important. Eyewitness testimonies are meant to be treated as independent
observations, and despite efforts aimed at keeping testimonies independent, research shows that
co-witnesses often do talk to each other about the event (Paterson et al., 2009). Specifically, 88%
of the real eyewitnesses at a UK identification suite reported having at least one co-witness
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present at the time of the criminal event. Stemming from that, 58% of those who were part of a
multi-witness event reported discussing the crime with their co-witness (Skagerberg & Wright,
2007). Furthermore, Paterson and Kemp (2006) found an even larger percentage of co-witnesses
that discussed details with one another. They discovered that 86% discussed details of events
with their co-witness. Overall, co-witness discussion is problematic because it is very likely that
the discussion may lead to memory conformity and confabulated eyewitness accounts
(Skagerberg & Wright, 2007). Therefore, there is a need for continued research on the effects of
co-witness information on memory.
Memory Conformity
As previously mentioned, participants will often report misleading information when it is
made available through co-witness discussion and in some cases, memory reports change after
exposure to co-witness information. This effect is known as “memory conformity.” For example,
some researchers have had participant pairs unknowingly watch different versions of a simulated
crime and then complete an initial memory task. Initial memories are typically very accurate, but
once participants discuss the simulated crime with their partners, most pairs demonstrate
memory conformity by mistakenly recalling information presented by their partner (who saw a
different version of the film) during the co-witness discussion (Wright et al., 2000; Gabbert et
al., 2003).
Wright et al. (2009) discussed three common reasons individuals may report
misinformation given by a co-witness. First, they might not want to disagree with the other
person, which is termed normative influence. This is when the individual will compare the cost
of disagreeing to the cost of being wrong. When social cost tends to be high, the individual will
be more likely to knowingly report errant information. Second, the individual may have beliefs
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that the other person is right. This can be described as informational influence. Individuals will
oftentimes weigh the relative likelihood of the other person being correct versus oneself being
correct. Different factors such as the other person having a better view (being in a better place to
encode the event), having a better memory, or appearing to have more confidence, can lead
someone to believe that the other individual’s memory is more accurate. The third reason is that
the individual may have constructed a memory based on what the other person said, which can
be termed memory distortion. Memory distortion occurs when there is information suggested by
another person that becomes a part of an episodic memory. Individuals might recall seeing
information that they only heard about from another eyewitness. Given these points, there is an
understanding that factors such as confidence, perceived expertise, and the overall social cost of
disagreeing with people play a role in memory conformity. The present study seeks to determine
whether social anxiety leads to more memory conformity in participants exposed to co-witness
information.
Individual Differences in Co-Witness Suggestibility
To date, there is significantly less research focusing on the interpersonal correlates of cowitness suggestibility—or an individual’s vulnerability to co-witness influence. More
exploration is needed to determine which individual differences might place a person at risk of
memory conformity when co-witness misinformation has been shared. According to Loftus
(2005), misinformation affects some people more than others. For example, age may play an
important role. When compared to older children and adults, younger children and the elderly are
much more susceptible to misinformation. Loftus (2005) also shares that personality variables
such as empathy, absorption, and self-monitoring have been shown to have a relationship with
greater susceptibility to misinformation.
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Additionally, Doughty et al. (2017) found relationships between the Big 5 personality
traits and memory conformity. Participants watched a simulated crime and then discussed the
film with a co-witness that contributed misinformation about the event throughout the
discussion. After discussing the film with the co-witness, the participants took a film recall test
individually. The results indicated that individuals with low scores on openness, extraversion,
and neuroticism were more likely to report post-event misinformation. Further, Mojtahedi et al.
(2017) exposed participants to post-event misinformation about a simulated crime through a cowitness discussion, and then statements about the crime were taken from participants.
Participants also completed the Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation-Behavior
assessment (FIRO-B; Schutz, 1958), which looks at measures of expressed and wanted control,
affection, and inclusion. The wanted control dimension of the FIRO-B was an accurate predictor
of co-witness suggestibility, such that high scores increased the likelihood of accepting cowitness misinformation. Further, interrogative suggestibility (i.e., increased vulnerability to
misleading interviews) may provide insights into factors that are related to greater co-witness
suggestibility. In particular, eyewitnesses with a high external locus of control, low memory
efficacy, and high levels of neuroticism were found to be more vulnerable to interrogative
suggestibility (Liebman et al., 2002). We may expect to find these same factors related to greater
co-witness suggestibility as well, as comparative research suggests interrogative suggestibility
may be comorbid with co-witness suggestibility (Thorley, 2013).
Understanding individual differences in susceptibility to misinformation is exceedingly
important, especially in a legal context. For example, being able to identify a vulnerable
eyewitness would be beneficial in a court setting. Oftentimes, eyewitness testimonies play a
concrete role when deciding whether someone is guilty or innocent (Doughty et al., 2017). When

7

SOCIAL ANXIETY AND CO-WITNESS SUGGESTIBILITY
a witness can be identified as vulnerable to misinformation, the jurors and legal professionals
would be able to consider the reliability of their statements. In turn, this might reduce the rate of
false convictions. In addition, if individual differences in susceptibility to misinformation can be
reliably established, interventions that aim to prevent those vulnerable eyewitnesses from sharing
their unwitnessed information can be developed. The true prevalence of influence is less likely to
be overlooked when individual differences in interpersonal characteristics are included in this
line of research (Mojtahedi et al., 2017).
Social Anxiety and Misinformation Susceptibility
In addition to personality traits, social anxiety is an individual difference trait that has
been found to increase susceptibility to co-witness information. According to the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – Fifth Edition (DSM-5), social anxiety is characterized
by a fear of social situations (real or imagined) where there is a possibility that the individual
may be scrutinized by others and a persistent avoidance of these situations (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). People that engage in social interaction can experience relatively low levels
of social anxiety, however for individuals with a social anxiety disorder, the fear can be
extremely intense (Kupper & Denollet, 2012). Symptoms such as blushing, trembling, heart
palpitations, and sweating are common. Social anxiety is associated with impaired working and
private relationships, poor family functioning, and onset of psychiatric conditions (Blanco et al.,
2001; Schneier et al., 1994). Therefore, social anxiety represents a considerable personal and
societal burden.
In the United States, the 12-month prevalence estimate of social anxiety disorder is
approximately seven percent (DSM-5, American Psychiatric Association, 2013). This rate
increases to about 13% for 18-to-29 year-olds (Kessler et al., 2005). Although the nature and
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prevalence of social anxiety has not been examined extensively in college students, some
research has found increased prevalence rates for this age group. Purdon et al. (2001) found that
a vast majority of the college students in their sample of 81 undergraduates experienced
symptoms of anxiety in social situations quite frequently, while Russell and Shaw (2009)
discovered that at least 10% of students reported experiencing marked to severe social anxiety.
Prior research has supported a connection between social anxiety and memory
conformity. In particular, both components of social anxiety (fear of negative evaluation and
social avoidance) have been correlated with a greater tendency toward conformity. Fear of
negative evaluation pertains to the high cost associated with disagreeing in a social situation.
Thus, if a person perceives the cost of disagreeing to be too high, they may be more likely to
agree with another person in a social situation. Findings from Zhang et al. (2016) suggest this to
be true—young adults with greater social anxiety were more likely to conform on a modified
Asch paradigm task when they were told others would see their responses. The authors suggested
greater conformity among those with higher social anxiety likely resulted from wanting to avoid
negative evaluation from others. Additionally, the tendency to conform out of fear of negative
evaluation has been extended to a memory conformity situation. Wright et al. (2010) had
adolescent participants complete a face recognition memory task in pairs and found scores on the
“fear of negative evaluation” subscale of the Social Anxiety Scale for Adolescents (La Greca &
Lopez, 1998) to be positively correlated with memory conformity. This suggested that greater
fear of negative evaluation resulted in a greater tendency to conform to a partner’s choice during
the recognition task.
Social avoidance pertains to the tendency to avoid social interactions and social
information. If a person consistently avoids social information and feels stressed during social
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interactions, then they may pay less attention to and process information from others more
poorly. In turn, we would expect less memory conformity from these individuals, as memory
conformity requires a person to adequately process and use social information. Prior research has
confirmed this to be the case—in particular, social avoidance was negatively correlated with
memory conformity in two recognition tasks completed by participants in pairs (Wright et al.,
2010; Wright et al., 2012). Despite the connection between components of social anxiety and
memory conformity, more research is needed to examine how social anxiety may impact
memory conformity within an eyewitness situation, particularly one involving susceptibility to
misleading co-witness information.
The Present Study
Study Design and Hypotheses
The present study contributes to the existing literature on co-witness influence and
memory conformity. In particular, the present study adds to our limited understanding of
individual differences in co-witness suggestibility by further examining social anxiety as a
variable of interest. Prior research has focused almost exclusively on personality correlates and
cognitive measures related to co-witness suggestibility (Read & Winograd, 1998; Mojtahedi et
al., 2017). Given the social situation in which co-witness suggestibility occurs, variables related
to social encounters (like social anxiety) should be considered when examining memory
suggestibility (Wright et al., 2010).
Additionally, the present study replicates and extends prior work identifying a
relationship between social anxiety and memory conformity (Wright et al., 2010). Despite
identifying this relationship, researchers acknowledged the importance of examining whether the
relationship holds with other populations, other measures of social anxiety, and within a more
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ecologically valid memory conformity paradigm. Given college students reportedly have higher
rates of social anxiety, it seems relevant to study the relationship between memory conformity
and social anxiety using a young adult rather than an adolescent population. Further, this study
utilizes a memory conformity procedure and recall task that is more generalizable to an actual
co-witness experience and includes the presentation of misleading information (e.g., Wright et
al., 2010).
The present study utilized a 2 x 3 between-subjects factorial design, with Social Anxiety
Level (measured as a continuous variable) and Post-Event Information Exposure (misleading,
accurate, or control) as the between-subjects factors. Recall accuracy and recall confidence were
the primary dependent variables of interest. Following the procedure of Goodwin et al. (2017),
participants watched a short film clip of a simulated crime. Post-event information (PEI) was
presented during the course of a live, collaborative discussion between participants and a trained
confederate. During the discussion, confederates provided either misleading or correct details
about the witnessed event. Participants then produced both collaborative and individual memory
reports and provided confidence ratings for their individual memory reports. Participants in the
control group did not participate in the collaborative discussion or receive post-event
information, but did provide memory reports for the witnessed event. Additionally, the present
study further addressed whether social anxiety impacted susceptibility to co-witness influence.
Based on prior research, the following predictions were made:
a) Recall accuracy will differ based on the type of post-event information received.
Specifically, participants who received accurate PEI and participants in the control
condition should recall more correct details, while participants who received misleading
PEI should recall more incorrect details.
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b) Recall accuracy will differ based on the type of post-event information received and
participants’ social anxiety level. Specifically, in the experimental conditions, those
higher in social anxiety are expected to recall more correct items and more misleading
items than those lower in social anxiety, potentially due to their increased susceptibility
to co-witness influence. Recall should be similar between those higher and lower in
social anxiety in the control condition, as these participants will not be exposed to the cowitness manipulation.
c) Recall confidence will differ based on the type of post-event information received.
Specifically, participants receiving correct PEI should be most confident in recall of
correct items relative to participants in the misleading PEI and control groups, while
participants receiving misleading PEI should be most confident in recall of misleading
items relative to the correct PEI and control groups.
Method
Participants and Confederates
In total, there were 65 undergraduate student participants (19 males and 42 females),
ranging in age from 18 years to 48 years (M = 21.25 years). This was about half of the total
number of participants needed for the study, based on the a priori power analysis. Most
participants were freshmen (38.5%) and sophomores (33.8%), while 15.4% were juniors, 7.7%
were seniors and 4.6% declared “other.” Participants were 72.3% Caucasian, 12.3%
Latinx/Hispanic, 7.7% “Other”, 4.6% African American, and 3.1% Asian American. All
participants were compensated for their participation in the form of class credit toward their
undergraduate psychology course.
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A group of ten undergraduate research assistants majoring in psychology were trained to
be the confederates in the study. In short, the confederates’ responsibilities included discussing
all critical items from the film clip during a collaborative discussion with the participant and
typing up the written report created by the confederate-participant pair. Overall, the
confederates’ main goal was to ensure each of the seven critical items was included in the paired
discussion. Each confederate was trained for one specific experimental condition (e.g.,
misleading confederate or accurate confederate). This way, scripted information was not
confused across the conditions.
Materials
Eyewitness Stimulus Film
A short video of a home robbery was created for this experiment. The video was two and
half minutes long and showed an individual entering a home, stealing several items that were in
plain sight (e.g., laptop, tablet, purse, money, television), and then exiting the home.
Confederate Scripts
In the experimental conditions, the confederates were provided with a general script that
included guidelines for the co-witness discussion (see Appendix A). Specifically, there were
seven critical items that were mentioned during the co-witness discussion (see Table 1 for a list
of the specific items). Correct PEI consisted of details about events that actually occurred within
the video, and misleading PEI consisted of incorrect details about the events that took place in
the video. Examples of the different types of post-event information participants received during
discussion include:
Correct PEI: ‘… then she grabbed the TV, and left out the patio door’
Misleading PEI: ‘… then she grabbed the TV, and left out the garage door’
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Table 1. Critical items in cued-recall test with information provided during CW discussion
CW discussion
information
Cued-recall test item

Correct

Misleading

What color shirt was the burglar
wearing?
Was she wearing glasses?
In what room was the first item
that the burglar picked up?
What color laptop did she
pick up?
What color purse did the
woman pick up?
What did the woman steal from
the kitchen table?
Where did the woman exit the
home?

Black

White

No
Kitchen

Yes
Living Room

Purple

Silver

Blue

Red

Money

Coupons

Patio/Sliding Door

Garage

Note: CW, co-witness
Filler Tasks
A series of filler tasks were used throughout the experiment. Participants were given
separate sets of math problems, general knowledge questions, vocabulary questions, the
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), and the Balanced
Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 1984).
Social Anxiety Measures
There are two common categories of social anxiety—social interaction anxiety and social
performance anxiety (social phobia) (Kupper & Denollet, 2012). The Social Phobia Scale (SPS)
and Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) were developed as separate self-report measures of
social anxiety (Mattick & Clarke, 1998) and were used as measures of social anxiety in the
present study. Often administered together, the SPS pertains to fears of scrutiny during
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observation by others, whereas the SIAS assesses anxiety experienced during interaction with
others. The SPS contains 20 items on which respondents indicate how “characteristic or true”
each statement is for them (0 = “not at all” to 4 = “extremely”). Items include both worries
pertaining to signs of nervousness (e.g., “I fear I may blush when I am with others.”) as well as
to scrutiny of performance (e.g., “I become anxious if I have to write in front of others.”). The
SIAS includes 19 items rated on a 5-point scale from 0 (“not at all characteristic of me”) to 4
(“extremely characteristic of me”). SIAS items pertain to discomfort in social settings (e.g., “I
am tense mixing in a group.”) including dyadic interactions (e.g. “I tense up if I meet an
acquaintance on the street.”). A total score from 0 to 80 is derived from the SPS and a total score
from 0 to 76 is derived from the SIAS, with higher scores indicating higher levels of the social
anxiety constructs. Internal consistency and test-retest reliability for the SPS and SIAS are wellsupported and validity studies support the distinction between social interactional anxiety and
scrutiny fears (Letamendi et al., 2010). It is worth noting that the scales were not used as a
diagnostic tool in the present study, but rather as a way to identify those with higher and lower
degrees of social anxiety.
Individual Cued-Recall Test
Memory accuracy was tested using a cued-recall test. Using a recall test is preferred
because these types of tests, compared to recognition tests, are more similar to actual eyewitness
interview and recall situations. A cued-recall test was created and administered individually to
participants (see Appendix B). The test consisted of 15 items, with seven critical items and four
non-critical items scored for accuracy. The other four items in the test were not scored for
accuracy. If participants were unsure of an answer, they could answer with “I don’t know” or “I
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don’t remember.” After each of their answers, the participants also provided a memory
confidence rating on a 7-point scale (1 = “not at all confident” and 7 = “extremely confident”).
Demographic Questionnaire and Post-Experiment Survey
A short demographic questionnaire was administered to the participants during the final
stage of their participation. The questionnaire included items related to gender identity, racial
and ethnic identity, age, and years of education. A post-experiment survey was created to
determine whether participants in the experimental conditions were aware of the experimental
manipulation (See Appendix C). In particular, participants were asked whether they had
discussed the film or study with anyone else who had participated in the experiment and what
they thought the purpose of the experiment was. Participants were also asked if they knew their
memory was going to be tested and if they noticed themselves going along with the other
participant (confederate). No participants were excluded from data analysis on the basis of
responses to the manipulation check questions.
Procedure
Due to the worldwide Coronavirus pandemic, participants were run individually through
a secure videoconferencing website called Zoom. All participants were told they were
participating in a study about personality and cognitive performance, so the true purpose of the
study was concealed. All data for this experiment was collected on Qualtrics as the experimenter
guided the participant through the study on the Zoom videoconference. In the experimental
conditions, the participant-confederate pair watched the home robbery video on their own
computers with a link that was provided to them by the experimenter. In the control condition,
participants watched the video on their own. At no point were the participants told their memory
for the video was going to be tested.
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Next, in the experimental conditions, the participant and the confederate discussed the
video before giving a collaborative eyewitness report. Specifically, the experimenter used these
instructions (as used in Goodwin et al., 2017):
I would like you to work together and discuss the event in order to create a single
eyewitness report for the event you just watched. You should pretend that you are real
eyewitnesses and you are waiting for the police to arrive to take your report.
The participant-confederate pair were further instructed to only include information in the
report that was collaboratively agreed upon. During training, the confederates were instructed to
have a friendly discussion with the participant about the film. The confederate’s role was to
ensure all critical information was discussed (e.g., a description of the suspect and the events that
occurred in the video). Discussions were no longer than five minutes in length and took place in
a breakout room on Zoom, so the experimenter was not present. Based on direction from
Goodwin et al. (2017), the confederate was the one to type the collaborative report to ensure that
it accurately and fully represented the discussion. The confederate also recorded the discussion in
the Zoom breakout room and all discussions were stored properly with the other data. Once the
reports were complete, the experimenter had the participant-confederate pair return to the main
Zoom room and gave further instructions about completing the subsequent filler tasks. In the
control condition, no discussion took place. Instead, control participants completed an additional
filler task for the same amount of time that the discussions took place in the experimental
conditions. Additionally, control participants typed up a report on their own.
Following the filler tasks, in the experimental conditions, the experimenter explained that
each person would be tested separately on their memory for the video. The participants were told
they were being tested first and the confederate was excused from the main Zoom room into their
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own breakout room to wait. In the control condition, participants were just told their memory for
the video was being tested. Once the cued-recall test was complete, participants were given the
two social anxiety measures, the manipulation check survey, and the demographic questionnaire.
Finally, participants were debriefed and asked not to discuss the experiment with other potential
participants.
Results
Social Anxiety and PEI Condition
In order to determine if initial differences between SIAS and SPS scores were present, a
one-way ANOVA for each social anxiety measure was conducted. Results indicated that there
were no significant differences between PEI conditions for SIAS scores (F (2, 62) = 1.124, p =
.331), but there were significant differences between PEI conditions for SPS scores (F (2, 62) =
4.081, p = .022). A subsequent Tukey HSD test was run to see where the significant differences
were present. Results indicated that there was a significant difference in SPS scores between the
misleading PEI and accurate PEI conditions (p = .024).
A Pearson correlation was conducted between the SPS and SIAS total scores and found
they were strongly correlated (r = .705, p < .001). Based on this finding, the scores on the SIAS
and SPS were combined into one total score for the remainder of analyses.
Memory Report Analysis (Collaborative Recall)
The confederate-participant collaborative memory reports were scored as the total
number of correct PEI items recalled (out of 7) and the total number of misleading PEI items
recalled (out of 7). Reports were scored by two independent coders. Inter-rater agreement for
correct recall and misleading recall was acceptable (76.19% and 78.5%, respectively).
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To compare differences in correct critical item recall in the collaborative report, an
independent samples t-test was run and revealed that participants receiving accurate PEI recalled
significantly more correct critical items than those receiving misleading PEI during the
collaborative discussion (t (1,40) = 7.118, p < .001). To compare differences between the number
of misleading critical items reported during the collaborative discussion, another independent
samples t-test was run and revealed that participants in the misleading PEI condition recalled
significantly more misleading critical items than those in the accurate PEI condition (t (1,40) = 6.095, p < .001).
Cued-Recall Test Analysis (Individual Recall)
To compare recall of accurate critical items between the conditions, a one-way ANOVA
was conducted. The main effect of PEI type was significant, indicating recall of accurate items
was significantly different between the three conditions (F (2, 62) = 13.509, p < .001). Follow up
Tukey HSD comparisons revealed that those in the accurate PEI condition recalled more correct
critical items than those in the misleading PEI (p = .002) and control groups (p <.001).
To compare individual recall of misleading critical items between the conditions, a oneway ANOVA was conducted. The main effect of PEI type was significant, indicating that recall
of misleading items was significantly different between the three conditions (F (2,62) = 10.855,
p < .001). Follow up Tukey HSD comparisons revealed that those in the misleading PEI
condition recalled more misleading critical items than those in the accurate (p < .001) and control
conditions (p = .048).
To determine if there was a difference in correct recall of non-critical questions between
the PEI conditions, a one-way ANOVA was conducted. The main effect of PEI type was
nonsignificant, indicating non-critical question correct recall was not significantly different
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between the conditions (F (2, 62) = 1.532, p = .224). See Table 2 for means and standard
deviations by condition and type of question.
Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of main effects for individual cued
recall by post-event information (PEI Type)
PEI Type
Misleading PEI
Accuracy Measure

Correct PEI

Control

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

(n = 20)

(n = 22)

(n = 23)

Critical Misinfo

1.45 (1.10)*

0.32 (.48)

0.87 (0.69)

Critical Correct

4.75 (1.29)

6.00 (1.23)*

4.26 (0.92)

Non-critical Correct

2.40 (0.94)

2.27 (0.77)

1.96 (0.88)

Note: Critical Misinfo, critical items answered with misinformation; Critical Correct, critical items
answered correctly; Non-critical Correct, non-critical items answered correctly; SD, standard deviation.
* p < .05.

Social Anxiety and Co-Witness Influence (Collaborative Recall)
To assess whether social anxiety influenced collaborative recall of correct critical items
between PEI conditions, a multiple linear regression test was conducted. Social anxiety was not
found to predict differences in correct item collaborative recall across conditions (B = -.002, p =
.816). However, a significant regression equation was found (F (2, 39) = 24.762, p < .001) with
an R2 of .559, indicating that being in the accurate PEI condition predicted higher recall of
accurate critical items during the collaborative recall task (B = 2.765, p < .001).
To assess whether social anxiety influenced collaborative recall of misleading items
between PEI conditions, another multiple linear regression test was conducted. Again, social
anxiety was not found to predict differences in collaborative recall of misleading items across
conditions (B = .002, p = .778). However, a significant regression equation was found (F (2, 39)
= 18.191, p < .001) with an R2 of .483, indicating that being in the accurate PEI condition
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predicted lower recall of misleading PEI during the collaborative recall task (B = -2.400, p <
.001).
Social Anxiety and Individual Recall Differences
In order to assess whether social anxiety influenced individual recall of critical questions
answered with misleading information between PEI conditions, a multiple linear regression test
was conducted. Social anxiety was not found to predict differences in recall of misleading PEI
across conditions (B = .000, p = .977). However, a significant regression equation was found (F
(2, 39) = 9.440, p < .001) with an R2 of .326, indicating that being in the accurate PEI condition
predicted lower recall of misleading PEI on the individual recall test (B = -1.129, p < .001).
To assess whether social anxiety influenced individual recall for critical questions
answered correctly between PEI conditions, another multiple linear regression test was
conducted. The results indicated that social anxiety did not predict differences in recall of critical
questions answered correctly across conditions (B = .007, p = .381). However, a significant
regression equation was found (F (2, 39) = 5.501, p = .008), with an R2 of .220, indicating that
being in the accurate PEI condition predicted differences in recall of critical questions answered
correctly (B = 1.123, p = .010).
Memory Confidence and Type of Post-Event Information
To compare individual recall confidence based on PEI type, a one-way ANOVA was
conducted. No significant differences in confidence were found for critical questions answered
correctly (F (2, 62) = .385, p = .682). Further, an independent samples t-test revealed that those
in the misleading PEI condition were significantly more confident in their recall of critical
questions answered with misleading information than those in the accurate PEI condition (t (1,
40) = -3.480, p = .001). Another one-way ANOVA found no significant differences in

21

SOCIAL ANXIETY AND CO-WITNESS SUGGESTIBILITY
confidence for non-critical questions answered correctly (F (2, 62) = .943, p = .395). Finally,
there were no significant differences in confidence for all non-critical questions (F (2, 62) = .231,
p = .794), or for all scored cued-recall questions (F (2, 62) = .815, p = .447).
Social Anxiety and Memory Confidence
To determine if there was a relationship between social anxiety and memory confidence,
a series of linear regressions were conducted. The results indicated that social anxiety did not
predict significant differences in confidence for critical questions answered correctly (B = .001, p
= .791), or for all cued-recall questions (B = -4.159, p = .991). Interestingly, social anxiety
almost predicted differences in confidence for critical questions answered with misleading
information at a level approaching significance (B = -.032, p = .062).
Post-Experiment Survey Differences
Based on guidance from Goodwin et al., (2017), additional analyses were conducted to
look for differences in post-experiment survey responses based on PEI condition. A Chi Square
test of independence indicated that participants in the accurate and misleading PEI conditions did
not differ in reports of “questioning their memory” in reaction to the confederate’s statements (c2
(1, N = 42) = .764, p = .382). Another Chi Square test of independence indicated that participants
in the accurate and misleading PEI conditions did not differ in reports of feeling themselves
“going along” with the confederate’s statements (c2 (1, N = 42) = .004, p = .952). A final Chi
Square test of independence indicated that participants in the accurate and misleading PEI
conditions did not differ in their reports of “changing their initial statements” (c2 (1, N = 42) =
.030, p = .863).
To examine whether social anxiety was related to post-experiment survey responses, a
series of point biserial correlations were conducted. First, social anxiety did not significantly
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relate to participants’ reports of “questioning their own memory” (r = -.078, p = .625). In
addition, social anxiety did not significantly relate to participants’ reports of “going along” with
the confederate (r = -.221, p = .161). Finally, social anxiety did not significantly relate to
participants’ reports of “changing their initial statements” (r = -.076, p = .631).
Discussion
The present study sought to replicate and extend the current eyewitness memory literature
by examining the impact on social anxiety on co-witness suggestibility. The present study was
the first known study to examine social anxiety as an individual risk factor for co-witness
suggestibility in a young adult population. Given that young adults may experience higher rates
of social anxiety, it was important to focus on that population specifically.
Overall, the hypotheses in the current study were partially supported. First, memory
conformity was demonstrated during collaborative recall between the confederate and
participant. Collaborative recall of misleading items was greater in the misleading PEI group
than the accurate PEI group, and collaborative recall of correct items was greater in the accurate
PEI group than in the misleading PEI group. These findings are similar to prior research
demonstrating memory conformity in a co-witness situation (Wright et al., 2010; Goodwin et al.,
2017). The current study also demonstrated co-witness misinformation effects. Individual recall
of misleading items was highest in the misleading PEI group compared to the accurate PEI
group. This finding is consistent with prior studies utilizing a co-witness to present
misinformation—groups encountering misinformation socially via a confederate typically report
more recall errors and greater recall of misleading details (Gabbert et al., 2004; Paterson &
Kemp, 2006; Goodwin et al., 2017).
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Three processes have been identified to explain memory conformity effects (Wright et
al., 2009). These include normative influence, informational influence, and memory distortion.
The current study found evidence for memory conformity effects, while also finding that recall
rates of misinformation changed slightly from collaborative to individual memory reports.
Specifically, on average, reporting of misinformation was higher in the collaborative report
compared to the individual recall test. The higher endorsement of misinformation in the
collaborative setting may be due in part to normative influence—or going along with the
confederate because the cost of disagreeing is perceived to be too high (Goodwin et al., 2017).
Additionally, current study found benefits associated with discussing an event with an
accurate co-witness. Specifically, recall accuracy differed based on the type of PEI participants
received. Recall of correct items was greater both collaboratively and individually in the accurate
PEI group compared to the control and misleading groups. This is in line with prior research
demonstrating greater correct recall in participants paired with an accurate co-witness (Paterson
et al., 2009; Goodwin et al., 2017).
Contrary to what was expected, recall accuracy was not influenced by social anxiety. We
originally planned to compare recall accuracy between participants with low vs. high social
anxiety but could not do so because of the number of current participants reporting high levels of
social anxiety. We initially planned to group participants using established SPS and SIAS cutoff
scores (18 and 22, respectively; Mortberg et al., 2017). All three groups (control, misleading PEI,
and accurate PEI) had average social anxiety scores that exceeded these cutoffs, indicating that a
majority of the current sample reported being highly socially anxious. This made creating
equivalent “low” and “high” social anxiety groups difficult. As a result of the lack of clear “low”
and “high” groups, social anxiety was run as a continuous predictor. However, it was not found
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to be a significant predictor of accurate recall or misleading recall in the co-witness discussion
conditions, contrary to what was hypothesized. It is important to note that the linearity and
normality assumptions were not met in the multiple regression model, which likely impacted the
ability of social anxiety to predict differences in recall. As more data is collected and the sample
size increases, it is hoped that the model improves or that group difference analyses are possible.
It was also hypothesized that recall confidence would differ based on the type of PEI
received. This was partially supported. The accurate PEI group did not report greater confidence
in correct item recall than the misleading PEI and control groups. This finding is not in line with
most prior research, which typically finds that accurate PEI participants report higher confidence
in correct recall than misleading PEI participants (Goodwin et al., 2017). The lack of differences
in confidence between PEI groups in the current study might be due to the critical items that
were selected for the recall test. Most of the critical items were more obvious details related to
the simulated crime, and thus accurate items may have been remembered more confidently
across all conditions.
Despite the lack of differences in correct item recall confidence, the misleading PEI
group reported greater confidence in misleading item recall than the other groups. Therefore, not
only were misleading PEI participants more likely to report and recall misleading details, but
they did so more confidently. Prior research has also found that misled participants recall
misleading information with high levels of confidence, or with as much confidence as nonmislead participants (Paterson & Kemp, 2006).
The findings in the current study are not without limitations. For the entirety of data
collection, participants were facing unprecedented times as the international Coronavirus
pandemic was at its peak. Many participants were likely experiencing heightened levels of
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anxiety, stress, or depression due to the pandemic. Indeed, a high percentage of participants
appeared to reach clinically significant levels of social anxiety, as reported on the SPS and SIAS.
This is consistent with other recent young adult mental health findings. Young adults reported
experiencing high rates of loneliness, COVID-19-specific worry, and low distress tolerance
during the pandemic. Additionally, these outcomes were significantly associated with clinical
levels of depression, anxiety, and PTSD (Liu et al., 2020). Attempting to study and measure
social anxiety was undoubtedly confounded by the mental health impacts of the pandemic.
Another limitation of the current study is that data was collected online via Zoom. This
type of social interaction might not hold the same type of influence on socially anxious
individuals, as they are able to manipulate how they are perceived via the video camera and
could participate from the comfort of their own homes. While all participants were required to
have their cameras on, this is quite different from an in-person co-witness discussion. Further,
many of the participant sessions were conducted at the beginning and end of the fall semester
when student stress and anxiety are also heightened. This type of data collection pattern in
undergraduate student populations can be cause for concern, especially in research that aims to
assess memory performance. Future research will benefit from utilizing an in-person study
design to replicate a co-witness situation where discussion occurs.
At present, it is unclear whether social anxiety will emerge as a risk factor for co-witness
suggestibility. Currently, higher social anxiety is not a clear predictor of greater susceptibility to
misinformation from a co-witness, nor is it a clear predictor of greater influence from an accurate
co-witness. This could be due to the current low sample size, or it could also be an early sign that
higher social anxiety is not a reliable risk factor for co-witness suggestibility in a young adult
population using this particular memory conformity paradigm.
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The findings from the present study bear relevance to the area of eyewitness memory and
further underscore the need to keep witnesses from discussing events. In particular, findings
from the present study show that witnesses report information from a co-witness as part of their
recall of a witnessed event—in some cases the co-witness information is accurate, but in other
cases the co-witness information is misleading. Altogether, this supports the idea that
misinformation about witnessed events is frequently passed along from a co-witness (Paterson &
Kemp, 2006; Skagerberg & Wright, 2008).
However, findings from the current study also illustrate benefits associated with
collaborative recall. Specifically, an accurate co-witness may encourage more accurate recall of
details that are central to a witnessed event. Recent research has revealed similar effects
associated with collaborative eyewitness recall (Thorley, 2018). Collaborative pairs recalled
details of a crime faster and recalled more correct information compared to individual
participants. Taken together, these findings suggest that the presence of a co-witness may not
always be deleterious to eyewitness memory.
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Appendix A
Confederate Script
Instructions to the Confederate: Have a friendly discussion that includes a depiction of the
suspect in the video and a description of the events that transpired. Please initiate the discussion
but be sure not to dominate it. Also make sure all critical details are discussed. If a participant
disputes any of the critical details presented during the discussion, respond by reiterating that
you remembered seeing the critical detail. Ex: “That is what I remember seeing.”
Critical Details to Discuss:
1) Shirt color
2) Glasses
3) Location of first burgled item
4) Laptop color
5) Purse color
6) Item stolen from kitchen table
7) Burglar exit location
Initiating the Discussion: If we need to talk about the event to create a single eyewitness report,
then maybe we should start at the beginning with the burglar’s appearance—I remember seeing
the burglar wearing a (black vs. white) shirt. Is that right? (wait for participant’s response) I also
remember that the burglar (was vs. wasn’t) wearing glasses. (wait for participant’s response)
We should probably try to remember the things the burglar stole, too. She took the tablet first
and I remember it was in the (kitchen vs. living room)—is that right? (wait for participant’s
response). I also remember her picking up a (purple vs. silver) laptop and putting it in her bag.
(wait for participant’s response) There was also a purse that she stole—I think it was a (blue vs.
red) purse. (wait for participant’s response) And there was (money vs. a coupon) on the table
that she put in her bag before she left. (wait for participant’s response) I also remember she left
the house through the (patio door vs. garage door). (wait for participant’s response)

35

SOCIAL ANXIETY AND CO-WITNESS SUGGESTIBILITY
Appendix B
Cued Recall Test
1. What color shirt was the burglar wearing? *
2. What color was her hair?
3. Was she wearing glasses? *
4. About how tall was the burglar?
5. What kind of shoes was she wearing?
6. What color was the door the woman used to enter the home?
7. In what room was the first item that the burglar picked up? *
8. Did you see her steal the tablet? **
9. What color laptop did she pick up? *
10. Did you see her steal the laptop? **
11. What color purse did the woman pick up? *
12. Did you see her steal the purse? **
13. What did the woman steal from the kitchen table? *
14. Did you see the woman steal the item from the kitchen table? **
15. Where did the woman exit the home? *
*Critical items manipulated with misleading or correct information provided during
discussion.
**Not scored.
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Appendix C
Post-Experiment Survey
1. Had you heard about this study from anyone else prior to participating? (yes or no; if yes,
please explain.)
2. What do you think the purpose of this experiment was?
3. Before viewing the video, were you aware that your memory for the video would be
tested?
4. After viewing the video, and before you were instructed to discuss the event, were you
aware that your memory for the video would be tested?
5. After the discussion, and before the personality and vocabulary measures, were you
aware that your memory for the video would be tested?
6. Did you notice yourself questioning your memory in reaction to the other participant’s
statements?
7. At any time, did you feel yourself ‘going along’ with the other participant’s statements
during the discussion in spite of what you really remembered? (If yes, please explain.)
8. Did you change any of your initial statements from the discussion when answering
questions during the individual memory test with the experimenter? (Please explain your
response.)
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